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Mending the imaginary wall 
between Indonesia and Malaysia
The case of maritime delimitation in the waters off 
Tanjung Berakit
I MADE ANDI ARSANA
Abstract
Due to its geographical location, Indonesia shares border areas with at least 
ten neighbouring countries with which maritime boundaries must be settled. 
As of March 2011, Indonesia is yet to finalize its maritime boundaries with 
various States including Malaysia with which four maritime boundaries need 
to be settled: the Malacca Strait, the South China Sea, the Sulawesi Sea, and 
the Singapore Strait (off Tanjung Berakit). It is evident that pending maritime 
boundaries can spark problems between Indonesia and Malaysia. The dispute 
over the Ambalat Block in 2005 and 2009 and an incident in the waters off Tanjung 
Berakit on 13 August 2010 are two significant examples. This paper discusses the 
incident in the waters off Tanjung Berakit, but will be preceded by a description 
of the principles of coastal States’ maritime entitlement pursuant to international 
law of the sea. Following the discussion, this paper provides suggestions for 
settling maritime boundaries in the area from technical/geospatial and legal 
perspectives.
Keywords
Indonesia, Malaysia, maritime boundary, delimitation, sovereignty, sovereign 
rights, technical/geospatial aspects of the law of the sea.
“Good fences make good neighbours” (Robert Frost 1917)
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1 Introduction
Frost (1917) seems to be right with his observation that “good fences make 
good neighbours”.1 This is confirmed by the pattern of relationships between 
Indonesia and Malaysia in the last few years. Both countries have yet to settle 
their maritime boundaries and it is the pending these boundaries that sparked 
problems and tensions. It is intriguing to observe that these tensions are by 
no means new despite both countries’ sincerity in finding solutions.
Tensions built between Indonesia and Malaysia in early 2005 and mid-2009 
about the Ambalat Block.2 In Indonesia, the media widely and excessively 
covered the issue and aggravated many Indonesian people. It was clear that 
the Ambalat issue was not the last unfinished business in relation to pending 
maritime boundaries between Indonesia and Malaysia. 
In August 2010, similar tensions built once again between the two 
countries in relation to an incident in the waters off Tanjung Berakit involving 
Indonesian officials, Malaysian fishermen and members of the Royal Malaysia 
Police (RMP). Like other issues regarding border disputes, the Indonesian 
media intensely covered the incident causing the tension to build even higher. 
The official press release of the Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and 
Fisheries (MMAF) stated that three officials of a MMAF patrolling team were 
arrested by RMP when they were patrolling the waters off Tanjung Berakit. 
According to a press release, the Indonesian patrolling team was on duty to 
protect the maritime area from a group of Malaysian fishermen who were 
allegedly fishing in Indonesian waters (MMAF 2010). A press release issued 
by the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) further asserted that the 
incident took place in Indonesian waters and that MoFA would be responsibly 
to do whatever needed to deal with the issue (MoFA 2010a). Similar stories 
were featured also through newspapers and other electronic news media in 
Indonesia. At the time of writing (March 2011), no tension is building even 
though the issue has not been settled. Both countries are cooperating to find 
a solution by intensifying negotiations regarding the delimitation of the 
maritime boundaries between them.
This paper analyses the aforementioned incident by focusing on technical/
geospatial and legal aspects in the context of sovereignty and/or sovereign 
rights. Suggestions for dispute resolution through maritime boundary 
delimitation by considering legal and technical aspects are also provided. 
To begin with, the principle of maritime zones and the jurisdiction of coastal 
States3 are presented, followed by the principle of maritime boundary 
delimitation. This part thoroughly describes how coastal States in the world 
1  Robert Frost wrote a metaphoric poem entitled “Mending Wall”, published in 1914 
and appeared as the first selection in Frost’s North of Boston (see Frost 1917).
2  For a detailed legal and technical analysis of the Ambalat case, see for example, 
Arsana (2010).
3  The term ‘coastal State’ refers to a State that geographically connects to sea/maritime 
areas or a State that has a coastline. It is intentional that the term ‘State’ referring to a country 
is written with a capital “S” in this paper to distinguish it from “state” which means ‘declare’ 
or ‘say’.
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are entitled to the maritime area around their land territory and why they 
have to share these maritime areas with their neighbours, which is known as 
maritime delimitation (United Nations 2000). Since this is a neutral scientific 
analysis, positions and information expressed here are not those of any 
government. However, any relevant parties may consider the suggestions 
provided in this paper as alternatives in settling maritime boundaries between 
Indonesia and Malaysia. 
2 Maritime claims and delimitation
In modern times, coastal States have extended their authority beyond their 
land territory to maritime areas. Efforts to this extension can be seen as early 
as the fifteenth century involving Spain and Portugal through the bull Inter 
Caterea dated on 4 May 1493 by Pope Alexander VI (Davenport 1917: 75-78).4 
By the twentieth century, coastal States sporadically claimed maritime areas 
adjacent to their land territory. A good example is the proclamation made by 
the American President, Harry S. Truman, in 1945. The proclamation explicitly 
states that “the Government of the United States regards the natural resources 
of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but 
contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United 
States, subject to its jurisdiction and control” (Presidential Proclamation No. 
2667 1945). This was soon followed by countries in Latin America such as 
Argentina, Chile, and Peru (United Nations 1982a). At that time, many other 
countries also expressed their unilateral claim over the maritime area around 
their land territory.
In order to regulate these sporadic and unilateral maritime claims by 
coastal States, the United Nations (UN) implemented a codification process, 
which officially started in 1958 (United Nations 1958). The most recent 
codification process was the United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) III concluded in 1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica, after a 
nine-year-long negotiation process. In the conclusion of the conference, the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 was finalized and 
open for signing. The world has embraced this Law of the Sea Convention 
(hereinafter referred to as the LOSC)5 ever since (United Nations 1982b). 
LOSC is considered the most comprehensive law of the sea convention ever 
and is termed “A Constitution of the Ocean” (Koh 1982: 1). Both Indonesia 
and Malaysia are parties to the convention, which means that both countries 
ratified the LOSC, and have adopted it in their national laws and regulations.
Pursuant to the LOSC a coastal State is entitled to zones of maritime 
jurisdiction measured from its baselines. In accordance to the LOSC, coastal 
States can opt to designate ”normal” baselines (LOSC, Article 5) or straight 
baselines (LOSC, Article 7). According to the LOSC (Article 46), a State 
that qualifies as an archipelagic State can designate archipelagic baselines 
4  For a detailed historical context of the bull Inter Caterea, see Van der Linden (1916).
5  United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), opened for signature 10 
December 1982, and came into force on 16 November 1994, 1833 UNTS 3.
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“joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of 
the archipelago” (LOSC, Article 47). Being an archipelagic State, Indonesia 
is entitled to archipelagic baselines. In addition to these, baselines can also 
include lines closing mouths of rivers (LOSC, Article 9) and mouths of bays 
(LOSC, Article 10), and baselines related to ports (LOSC, Article 11) and 
roadsteads (LOSC, Article 12). A State may use a combination of different types 
of baselines to construct the overall baseline around its coastline (LOSC, Article 
14). In the Indonesian case, archipelagic baselines serve as a belt enclosing the 
entire archipelago that encompasses big and small islands. This belt serves as 
the reference from which maritime zones are measured. 
Measured seaward from its baselines, a coastal State may theoretically 
claim the full suite of zones of maritime jurisdictions provided for in 
accordance with the LOSC. These zones include a twelve-nautical-miles (M)6 
breadth territorial sea (LOSC, Article 3), a contiguous zone out to 24 M from 
baselines (or 12 M from territorial sea limits) (LOSC, Article 33), an exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) out to 200 M (LOSC, Article 57) and a continental shelf 
that may extend up to 350 M or even more (LOSC, Article 76) as Figure 1 
illustrates. The outer limits of a continental shelf, unlike the limits of other 
zones, which depend only on distance, depend also on the geology and the 
geomorphology of the seabed. That is why the outer limit of a continental 
shelf is not as fixed as other zones. In addition to the aforementioned zones, 
a coastal State is also entitled to, when applicable, internal waters measured 
landward from baselines.
6  The symbol used for nautical miles in this paper is ”M”, where 1 M = 1,852 metres.
Figure 1. Maritime jurisdictions of a coastal State pursuant to the LOCS
(Arsana and Schofield 2009: 64).
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Technically speaking, a maritime claim involves the application of 
geospatial discipline such as sea tide observation/definition in defining 
baselines. Geodetic application is also involved in, for example, defining the 
distance from baselines to the outer limits of a particular maritime zone. For 
practical purposes, distances are measured on a nautical chart so that nautical 
charts play an important role in maritime claims and delimitations (Arsana 
and Sumaryo 2008).
For each maritime zone, coastal States exercise either full sovereignty or 
sovereign rights limited to specific purposes. Coastal States have sovereignty 
over internal waters, over archipelagic waters within archipelagic baselines 
(such as those defined by archipelagic States) and over the territorial sea. With 
regard to all of these zones, coastal State’s sovereignty extends through the 
seabed and subsoil, to the water column and airspace above. Within the EEZ 
and the continental shelf, by contrast, coastal States have specific sovereign 
rights (not full sovereignty) to utilize and manage natural resources (fishing, 
oil and gas mining, etcetera). While the EEZ relates to both seabed and subsoil 
and the water column above the seabed, the continental shelf relates solely 
to the seabed and the subsoil.7 The High Seas are that part of the sea that 
excludes the EEZ, the territorial sea or the internal waters of a coastal State, or 
the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State (LOSC, Article 86). The Area 
covers the seabed region beyond coastal States’ continental shelf, which is 
considered the common heritage of mankind (LOSC, Article 136).
A further difference between the various maritime zones of jurisdiction 
is that some of them, such as the EEZ, require an active claim on the part of 
the coastal State while some do not. In particular, continental shelf rights are 
inherent and “do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any 
express proclamation” (LOSC, Article 77 (3)). This means that a coastal State 
may explore and utilize natural resources within its continental shelf without 
making an express claim to it. The basis for this distinct treatment rests on 
the concept that the coastal State possesses rights to its continental shelf as 
the “natural prolongation of its land territory” into and under the sea (LOSC, 
Article 76 (1)). LOSC provides that a coastal State’s continental shelf extends 
beyond the limits of its territorial sea “to the outer edge of the continental 
margin” or, to 200 M from its relevant baselines where the continental margin 
does not extend to that distance. The procedure to delineate the outer limits 
of the continental shelf beyond 200 M is set out in Article 76 of the LOSC.
The limits of a coastal State’s maritime jurisdiction can be established in 
one of three ways. First, maritime claims can be generated to the full extent 
allowed for under international law, provided there are no analogous claims by 
neighboring States. Second, where overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction 
exist, maritime boundaries may be delimited between neighbouring States. 
Thirdly, with respect to continental shelf limits, the delimitation of its outer 
7  It is worth noting, however, that rights over seabed and subsoil claimed as part of 
the EEZ under Part V of LOSC are exercized in accordance with LOSC Part VI dealing with 
the continental shelf. See, LOSC, Article 56(3). 
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limits involves a submission process to the United Nations Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) as previously mentioned.
Provided that a coastal State does not have any neighbours making 
overlapping claims for a particular zone, it can define its maritime limits 
unilaterally. For example, if the coastal State has no neighbours within 24 M 
distance from its baselines, it can unilaterally define its territorial sea limits. 
With regard to this option, the outer limits of maritime zones are commonly 
defined using the method of envelope of arc (Carleton and Schofield 2001) as 
illustrated by Figure 2. The limits of such claims are generally dependent on 
the baselines from which these maritime claims are measured and thus may 
change as the baselines shift. However, it is worth noting that this method 
employs only relevant basepoints along baselines to generate maritime limits. 
Depending on the shape and the configuration of the baselines, not every point 
along these baselines will dictate the location of maritime limits (Schofield 
and Arsana 2010). In other words, while some parts of the baselines may be 
crucial in constructing maritime limits, other parts may not contribute to the 
same extent due to their geographical locations along the baselines. However, 
it is generally true that changes in baselines can shift maritime limits.
Figure 2. Envelope of arc and relevant basepoints (Schofield and Arsana 
2010: 8).
It has been observed that if all coastal States were to make their maximum 
maritime claims permitted by the LOSC, around 44.5% of the world ocean 
could possibly fall under some form of national jurisdiction. This means that 
the remaining high seas would encompass approximately 55.5% of world’s 
ocean surface (Pruett 2004 in Prescott and Schofield 2005: 9, 27). Interestingly, 
it is hard to find a coastal State that can claim a full suite of maritime zones 
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without having overlapping claims with its neighbours. To be able fully to 
claim the EEZ, for example, the distance of a coastal State from its neighbours 
must be at least 400 M (that is, the breadth of two EEZs). In case of a continental 
shelf, the distance required may be even more (LOSC, Article 76). However, 
this situation does not affect the way the breadth of maritime zones is, 
theoretically, measured from baselines.
Considering the geographical location of coastal States in the world and 
the configuration of their coasts, overlapping claims of maritime zones among 
coastal States is inevitable (see Figure 3). Consequently, maritime delimitation 
differentiates maritime boundaries. Maritime delimitation between States is 
therefore another way for coastal States to define the limits of their maritime 
zones. While the first option is a unilateral process, maritime delimitation 
in the second option is a bilateral or multilateral process. The agreed line 
resulting from the delimitation process will then serve as the outer limit of 
maritime zones of a coastal State. In other words, in many cases, the definition 
or the outer limits of maritime zones/jurisdiction cannot be accomplished 
unilaterally but multilaterally where overlapping claims occur among several 
States. 
In line with the above principle, Indonesia, for example, cannot unilaterally 
define the outer limit of its territorial sea in maritime area to the north of Batam 
and Bintan Islands (the Singapore Strait) since the breadth of the strait is less 
than 24 M. The shortest distance between Indonesia’s archipelagic baselines 
and Singapore’s Pulau Sentosa, for example, is around 7 kilometers, which 
equals 3.8 M.8 If Indonesia defines the breath of its territorial sea up to 12 M 
northward then the claim will encompass Singaporean and Malaysian land 
territories. This is undoubtedly unfair for Malaysia and Singapore, which 
also posses the same rights or entitlements over maritime area as they, like 
Indonesia, are also parties to the LOSC. To overcome the potential overlapping 
claim, the three countries need to compromise and define lines to divide 
maritime entitlements among them. Following the provision set forth by 
the LOSC, Indonesia has ten neighbouring countries with which maritime 
boundaries need to be settled. Those countries are India, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Vietnam, the Philippines, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Australia and 
Timor-Leste (Oegroseno 2009). It is understandable that maritime delimitation 
is by no mean an easy task for Indonesia with that many neighbours.
The process of maritime boundary delimitation between two or more 
coastal States is governed by the principles and rules of public international 
law (Prescott and Schofield 2005). International law provides the “rules 
of the game” explaining how maritime boundary delimitations should be 
established. However, maritime boundary delimitation is usually resolved 
either through negotiation among affected parties or by submission of the 
case to a third party (Prescott and Schofield 2005). This third party can be 
8  Measurement was conducted on British Admiralty Chart (BAC) Number 3831 of the 
Singapore Strait and on Google Earth.
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arbitrators, mediators, courts, or tribunals such as the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ)9 and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).10
Figure 3 shows that overlapping claims takes place in the EEZ and the 
continental shelf because the distance between State A and B is less than 400 
M but more than 24 M. If the distance between two neighboring States is less 
than 24 M, their territorial seas will overlap. This is to illustrate that maritime 
boundary delimitation can be required for the territorial sea, the EEZ, or the 
continental shelf, depending on the distance between the States in question. In 
this regard, rules governing maritime boundary delimitation for these different 
zones are also different. For the territorial sea, for example, it is explicitly stated 
in the LOSC that “neither of the two opposite or adjacent States is entitled to 
extend its territorial sea beyond the median line” unless either State involved 
agrees otherwise, or due to the existence of “historic title or other special 
circumstances” (LOSC, Article 15). It is understood from this provision that 
the method to delimit the territorial sea is explicitly mentioned in the LOSC 
as the median or equidistance line.11 However, the LOSC does not mention 
9  See International Court of Justice at <http://www.icj-cij.org>.
10  See International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea at <http://www.itlos.org>.
11  The manual on the technical aspects of the LOSC published by International 
Hydrographic Bureau (2006, 6: 3) states that the term “median line” is similar to “equidistance 
Figure 3. Maritime zones based on the LOSC (Carleton and 
Schofield 2001: 53).
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specific methods for delimitating EEZ and continental shelf boundaries in case 
of overlapping claims between two or more States. Provisions in the LOSC 
only state that EEZ boundaries between States with opposite or adjacent 
coastlines should be established to “achieve an equitable solution” (LOSC, 
Article 74). “Equitable solution” is also the term used for the delimitation of 
the continental shelf in case of overlapping claims between States (LOSC, 
Article 83). Notwithstanding the positive intention of the LOSC in using the 
phrase “equitable solution” in delimiting the EEZ and the continental shelf 
boundaries, as said, the Convention does not specifically mention the method 
to be used in establishing boundary lines so this leaves the phrase open to 
interpretations. 
It is worth restating that the dimension of maritime zones is not only 
horizontal in nature but also vertical. While one particular zone like the 
territorial sea encompasses the seabed, the water column and airspace 
superjacent to the water, other zones like the continental shelf only covers the 
seabed. In addition, according to the LOSC as shown in Figure 3, particular 
maritime spaces may fall within two different zones/jurisdictions. For 
example, the maritime area beyond 12 M but within 200 M from baselines is 
considered part of both the continental shelf and the EEZ. Accordingly, the 
zone delimited by a line must specifically define whether the delimitation 
line is for both the continental shelf and the EEZ or for the continental shelf 
only. Take for example that two countries, opposite each other at a distance 
of 300 M, manage to delimit the continental shelf between them but not the 
EEZ. This delimitation only divides the seabed but not the water column. One 
might see lines drawn on a map but the lines only deal with the seabed, while 
the water column has yet to be divided between the two.12
The practical consequence of the aforementioned arrangement is that 
clarity has been established regarding seabed resources such as oil, gas and 
sedentary species but not fish. Sedentary species are organisms that at their 
harvestable stage either are “immobile on or under the seabed or are unable 
to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil” 
(LOSC, Article 77 (4)). It is also worth noting that the continental shelf 
regime emerged and was accepted significantly earlier (in 1958) than the 
EEZ (in 1982). Accordingly, maritime delimitation conducted between 1958 
and 1982 for maritime areas beyond the territorial sea, was generally for the 
continental shelf (seabed), excluding the water column. In the recognition 
of the EEZ regime (water column) by the international community through 
the LOSC, it is not difficult to find a situation where the continental shelf 
(seabed) has been delimited but not the EEZ or the water column. For the case 
of Indonesia and Malaysia, for example, both countries have agreed upon 
seabed delimitation in some locations, but have yet to establish EEZ (water 
line”, “a line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the territorial sea 
baselines of two States”.
12  For an analysis of maritime delimitation in a multizonal context (see Papanicolopulu 
2007).
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column) boundaries. Good examples of this situation are in the northern part 
of the Malacca Strait and the northern part of the South China Sea, close to 
Natuna Islands. An existing situation can be found in the Timor Sea between 
Indonesia and Australia. Seabed boundaries were delimited in the 1970s and 
the EEZ boundaries were only agreed in 1997 (Prescott 1997). Interestingly, 
the two boundary lines do not coincide so that in this particular maritime 
area, the seabed belongs to Australia but the waters superjacent to it belongs 
to Indonesia. It is not hard to imagine how complex the arrangement is when 
it comes to ocean management (Herriman and Tsamenyi 1998).
The third option to define the outer limits of maritime jurisdiction is 
through a submission to a third party as in the case of the continental shelf 
beyond 200 M from baselines. In order to confirm its sovereign rights over areas 
of the continental shelf beyond 200 M from its baseline, the LOSC provides 
that a coastal State should make a submission regarding its proposed outer 
continental shelf limits mainly on the basis of geological and geomorphologic 
evidence, and submit this to the United Nations Commission on the Limits 
of the Continental Shelf (CLCS or the Commission).13 The continental 
shelf beyond 200 M from the baseline is commonly termed the ”outer” or 
”extended” continental shelf or ECS (see Figure 1). Determining the outer 
limit of the ECS involves complicated procedures and enormous resources. 
The Commission in its Scientific and Technical Guidelines (CLCS/11) which 
were adopted on 13 May 1999 also detailed the procedure for the delineation of 
the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 M.14 Once the Commission 
has delivered its recommendations to the coastal State, that State may declare 
the outer limits of its outer continental shelf which are “final and binding” 
when defined “on the basis of” the Commission’s recommendations (LOSC, 
Article 76 (8)). In other words, even though the outer limit of the continental 
shelf is not definitive in terms of distance from baselines, unlike the outer 
limits of other zones, the limit is fixed in terms of location once it has been 
properly established pursuant to Article 76 of the LOSC. Unlike defining the 
outer limits of other maritime zones, defining outer continental shelf limits 
is much more complex, time consuming and costly. Relevant analyses on 
its complexity have been carried out, for example, by Arsana (2007a) and 
Schofield, Arsana and Van de Poll (2010).
 Irrespective of the way the limits of maritime zones/jurisdiction are 
established, one important fact is that the lines are imaginary or virtual in 
13  The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf was established pursuant to 
LOSC, Annex II. It consists of 21 experts in Geology, Geophysics, Hydrography, and Geodesy, 
who are elected from State parties to the LOCS every five years. More information of the 
Commission can be obtained from its official website: <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
clcs_new/clcs_home.htm>.
14  The Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the Commission contains technical 
and scientific procedures to define the outer limits of continental shelf. It is published in 
document CLCS/11 and is available online at <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/
commission_documents.htm#Guidelines>. For another analysis concerning outer continental 
shelf delineation, see, for example, Schofield, Arsana, and Van de Poll (2010).
10 11Wacana, Vol. 13 No. 1 (April 2011) I MADE ANDI ARSANA, Mending imaginary wall
nature. Unlike land boundaries that can be marked with monuments/pillars, 
maritime boundaries are marked usually with nothing. It is almost impossible 
to install pillars, monuments, or walls to mark maritime boundary lines, so 
that the boundaries are invisible. Establishing maritime boundaries, in this 
case, is like mending a virtual wall between two neighbouring States. In the 
language of Claussen (2009), they are “invisible borders”. Accordingly, the 
approach for law enforcement should reasonably be different compared to 
that of land boundaries. Understanding and the utilization of  navigational 
aids such as maps/charts and global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) such 
as the American Global Positioning System (GPS) is essential in relation to 
maritime boundaries delimitation and maintenance (Arsana 2007b).
3 Tanjung Berakit incident
3.1 Location does matter
Similar to other boundary issues involving Indonesia and Malaysia, the 
Tanjung Berakit incident on 13 August 2010 easily made it to the headlines 
of newspapers and television news in Indonesia. As previously mentioned 
the incident involved the apprehension of seven Malaysian fishermen by 
Indonesian officials and was followed by the seizure of three Indonesian 
officials by the Royal Malaysian Police (MoFA 2010a). 
In analysing a case of border crossing, information on location is essential. 
Unfortunately, for the purpose of this paper, information on the accurate 
position of the incident is unavailable from official sources. However, 
descriptive information provided by officials from the Indonesian MMAF 
and MoFA in their official press releases indicate that the incident took place 
in the waters off Tanjung Berakit (MMAF 2010; MoFA 2010a) as illustrated 
by Figure 4.
The waters off Tanjung Berakit are located to the north of Indonesia’s Pulau 
Bintan, which in the international geographical naming convention is part 
of the Singapore Strait. The incident took place in the maritime area close to 
three small geographical features (islands/rocks): Pedra Branca, Middle Rock, 
and South Ledge as illustrated by Figure 4 (see also subsection 3.2). Malaysia 
and Singapore have disputed these three features for around 30 years until 
the dispute was decided by the International Court of Justice on 23 May 2008 
(International Court of Justice 2008). The shortest distance between Indonesia 
(Pulau Bintan) and Malaysia (Johor) in the area is less than 24 M so that the 
maritime area between the two is territorial sea.15 Considering that Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore have ratified the LOSC,16 the three States are entitled 
to a 12-M territorial sea measured from their respective baselines/coastlines. 
Since the distance and maritime space available is limited, it is impossible for 
the three States to claim a full 12-M territorial sea without having overlapping 
15  The distance was measured on a British Admiralty Chart (BAC) Number 3831.
16  Indonesia was first to ratify the LOSC in 1985 by Law UU No. 17/1985 followed by 
Singapore on 17 November 1994 and Malaysia on 14 October 1996 (see:United Nations 2011).
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claims. Accordingly, the maritime delimitation for the territorial sea among 
the three neighbouring States is inevitable.
3.2 The absence of maritime boundaries and existing 
unilateral claims
Indonesia and Malaysia have yet to agree on maritime boundaries (territorial 
sea) around Tanjung Berakit. One of the reasons is the long-standing three 
decades old dispute between Malaysia and Singapore regarding the sovereignty 
over three geographical features that is still pending maritime delimitation. 
They both claim sovereignty over three features Pedra Branca (Batu Puteh), 
Middle Rock, and South Ledge as illustrated by Figure 4 (International Court 
of Justice 2008). Maritime entitlement cannot be decided when the sovereignty 
over these three features remains uncertain. The dispute was brought before 
the ICJ and was decided on 23 May 2008 (International Court of Justice 2008). 
The court decided that Pedra Branca is awarded to Singapore and Malaysia 
gains Middle Rock. Interestingly, the court did not specifically decide the 
ownership of South Ledge and the decision merely declares that the low tide 
elevation (LTE)17 belongs to the State in the territorial waters of which it is 
located (International Court of Justice 2008: paragraphs 299-300). 
It is worth noting that even though no maritime boundaries have been 
agreed upon, Indonesia and Malaysia both have interest in the waters off 
17  A low-tide elevation or LTE is a naturally formed area of land which is surrounded 
by and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide (LOSC, Article 13 (1)). 
Figure 4. Map showing the location of incident in the waters off Tanjung 
Berakit (Map by the author).
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Tanjung Berakit. This interest is, among other things, economically motivated 
to explore and utilize maritime natural resources. In addition, both Indonesia 
and Malaysia have made their own maritime claims (unilateral claims) in 
the area although any final agreement is yet to be reached. These unilateral 
claims seemed to be the cause of the incidents on 13 August 2010. Indonesia’s 
unilateral maritime claim is depicted on an Indonesian Map issued in 2009. 
According to the MMAF’s press release on 15 August 2010, Indonesia bases its 
claim on the MMAF’s Regulation number 1 of 2009 on Fisheries Management 
Area or Wilayah Pengelolaan Perikanan (WPP) of the Republic of Indonesia 
(MMAF 2009, 2010). The regulation is visualized by a map showing WPP 
in eleven different locations/zones, pursuant to Article 1 (2) of the Ministry 
Regulation. Based on the descriptive information provided by MMAF and 
MoFA, it can be concluded that the incident took place in WPP-711, a zone of 
fisheries management around the Singapore Strait extending northeastward 
to the South China Sea. As illustrated by Figure 5, WPP-711 is an area within 
a polygon represented by lines with fish symbols. The map was issued by 
the Indonesian Navy Hydro-Oceanographic Office (Dishidros 2009) and 
was officially published by MMAF in November 2009. Similarly, MoFA also 
asserted that the incident took place in Indonesian waters, based on map No. 
349 of 2009, which clearly depicts the Indonesian claims (MoFA 2010a).
On the other side, Malaysia also has its unilateral claim in the water area 
off Tanjung Berakit. As asserted by the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Malaysia bases its claim on a map it calls Peta Baru 1979, issued in December 
1979. The 1979 map visualizes the outer limits of Malaysia’s maritime claim, 
which is reasonably excessive in nature, particularly for those in the Sulawesi 
Figure 5. Part of WPP Map pursuant to MMAF’s Regulation number 
1 of 2009 (Modified from WPP Map (Dishidros 2009)).
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Sea and the Singapore Strait. The map clearly includes most of the maritime 
area around Tanjung Berakit to be part of Malaysia’s territory. Indonesia, as 
the other States in the region, refuses to recognize the map and sent notes of 
protest notes to the Malaysian Government (Haller-Trost 1998). According to 
Haller-Trost (1998), Indonesia sent the protest note in February 1980 in relation 
to the fact that Pulau Sipadan and Pulau Ligitan were also included on the map 
as part of Malaysian territory, while the dispute over their sovereignty had not 
yet been settled. Protest notes were also sent by the Philippines and China in 
relation to the Spratly Islands. Singapore sent its protest note in April 1980 in 
relation to Pedra Branca that was included as part of Malaysia’s territory, the 
sovereignty over which was not yet decided at that time. Some other protest 
notes were also sent by Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan, and United Kingdom on 
behalf of Brunei Darussalam. Simply put, the 1979 map is Malaysia’s unilateral 
map that is not recognized by its neighbours and the international community. 
However, the 1979 map remains an official map of Malaysia even until the 
present time (March 2011). 
Figure 6. Part of Malaysia’s 1979 map depicting its claim in the waters off 
Tanjung Berakit (the Singapore Strait).
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On the 1979 map, Malaysia’s claim in the maritime area around Tanjung 
Berakit is depicted by lines labeled with numbers in circles as illustrated by 
Figure 6. On the other hand, the Malaysian media reported that the Malaysian 
fishermen the Indonesian officials captured were fishing in Malaysian waters. 
An article in The Star Online (2010), for instance, asserted that the fishermen 
were in the waters off Middle Rocks, which apparently under Malaysian’s 
domestic law is part of Malaysian territory. 
The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Marty Natalegawa, asserted 
that both Indonesia and Malaysia base their justification of border crossings on 
their unilateral claims. It is worth noting that official statements in responding 
to this kind of issue are usually highly diplomatic in nature. Sentences like 
“it is undisputable that the area is part of our territory” or “we have had 
indisputable sovereignty over the area since time immemorial” are usually 
used in public statements. These expressions or statements are common in 
order to strengthen each party’s position in diplomacy. For instance, in actual 
negotiations, those asserting statements serve as supporting evidence that a 
State is consistent and persistent with its unilateral claim. This, in turn, enables 
a State to maintain its position with strong arguments on the negotiating table. 
Ideally speaking, the management and the utilization of maritime natural 
resources can start after the establishment of maritime boundaries. In practice, 
it is not impossible for two or more States to agree on resources management 
even before definitive border lines have been clearly defined, as long as the 
arrangement does not prejudice future maritime delimitation (LOSC, Article 
83 (3)). In addition, it is common that a State starts exploring/utilizing natural 
resources in maritime area where maritime boundaries are pending, based 
on unilateral claims. This undoubtedly can build tension between neighbors 
and seems to be the case with Indonesia and Malaysia.
3.3 Geospatial analysis on the Tanjung Berakit incident
In finalizing this paper, the author used the geospatial and legal approach. 
Malaysia’s 1979 map and Indonesia’s 2009 map were used to analyse each 
party’s unilateral claims. Both of them were then combined to produce a 
new map showing the overlapping claims of the two States. The Indonesian 
2009 map was overlaid with Malaysia’s 1979 map using the principles and 
functions in geographic information system (GIS)18 to generate a new map as 
illustrated by Figure 7.19
18  Simply speaking, GIS refers to a computer-based technology for retrieving, storing, 
and organizing data based on its location on a map. For further explanation on GIS, refer to, 
for example, Longley et al. (2001).
19  Technically speaking, the process involves geo-registration of coordinates and geodetic 
datum unification into a widely used geodetic datum called WGS 1984 datum. Put simply, 
geodetic datum is a reference from which measurements are made so that position can be 
expressed in coordinates. It was then followed by overlaying process to identify overlapping 
claims. The process was carried out with the assistance of GIS software called CARIS LOTS™.
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Figure 7 shows that Indonesia and Singapore have established territorial sea 
boundaries that consist of two segments. The first segment is the line starting 
from point 1 and ends at point 6, agreed by the two States in 1973.20 The second 
segment starts at point 1 heading westward and ends at point 1C, agreed by 
the two States on 10 March 2009 (MoFA 2009). Indonesia ratified the latest 
agreement of 2009 through Law No. 4 of 2010, promulgated on 22 June 2010 
(MoFA 2010b). Figure 7 also shows that Indonesia and Malaysia have yet to 
establish maritime boundaries between them for maritime areas to the east 
of the existing Indonesia-Singapore boundary lines signed in 1973 and 2009.
As previously mentioned, Indonesia and Malaysia both made unilateral 
maritime claims in the waters off Tanjung Berakit. By combining Malaysia’s 
1979 map and Indonesia’s 2009 map, an overlapping area was generated as 
represented by the shaded area enclosed by dashed lines in Figure 7. The 
possible locations of the fishermen’s boat/vessel, according to this new 
synthetic map, are in the areas labeled A, B, C, and D in Figure 7. The location 
labeled A is safe and legal for Malaysia’s fishermen since it is within Malaysia’s 
claim and is beyond what Indonesia claims on its 2009 map. Meanwhile, the 
location labeled C and D are also safe and legal for Indonesia’s fishermen since 
they fall within Indonesia’s claim and are beyond Malaysia’s claim. 
If, for some reason, Malaysian fishermen enter area C or Indonesian 
fishermen enter area A, it may be considered an encroachment. Under a 
different scenario, infringement is more obvious if Malaysian fishermen come 
20  The treaty and an analysis on it can be obtained from the US State Department. 
Available from <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/61500.pdf>.
Figure 7. A new map combining Indonesia’s 2009 and Malaysia’s 1979 map
(Analysis by the author).
16 17Wacana, Vol. 13 No. 1 (April 2011) I MADE ANDI ARSANA, Mending imaginary wall
to Indonesia’s archipelagic waters within the belt of Indonesia’s archipelagic 
baselines (area D). Complications will arise when fishermen from either 
Malaysia or Indonesia enter area B. Indonesian fishermen entering into area 
B will undoubtedly be considered an infringement by Malaysia’s patrolling 
officials. Likewise, Indonesia’s patrolling officials will also declare that 
Malaysian fishermen have committed a border crossing if they enter area B. In 
such a situation, clash and tension can be avoided if Indonesia and Malaysia 
implement a common standard operational procedure in the overlapping/
disputed area. This provisional agreement is important before the two States 
agree upon final maritime delimitation.
3.4 Maritime boundary delimitation
Maritime delimitation to establish final and binding maritime boundaries 
between Indonesia and Malaysia in the waters off Tanjung Berakit is an ideal 
approach to settle maritime disputes between the two States. Ideally speaking, 
the boundary line should be the prolongation or continuation (eastward) 
of the Indonesia-Singapore territorial sea boundary, starting at point 6 (see 
Figure 7). Accordingly, this delimitation process needs the involvement of not 
only Indonesia and Malaysia, but also Singapore. To deal with the particular 
area where maritime boundary segments among the three States potentially 
converge, a trilateral meeting/negotiation is required. This is to define what 
it is usually termed as a ”tri-junction point”. Having said this, even though at 
a particular moment in time Indonesia will be ready to negotiate, the process 
cannot proceed if one of its two neighbors (Malaysia or Singapore) is not yet 
ready or unwilling to do so. In line with this theory, Indonesia’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs asserted that Indonesia was ready to negotiate at any time 
but Malaysia, at the time of speaking (August 2010), was not (MoFA 2010a). 
The process of maritime delimitation considers legal and geospatial/
technical aspects in its completion. Pursuant to LOSC, Article 15 of LOSC 
governs territorial sea boundary delimitation. The provision states that where 
“two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States 
is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its 
territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from 
the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial 
seas of each of the two States is measured” (LOSC, Article 15). This implies 
that in territorial sea delimitation, the use of the equidistance line is preferred. 
However, this provision does not apply “where it is necessary by reason of 
historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of 
the two States in a way which is at variance therewith”. In other words, even 
though the use of the equidistance or median line is the preferred method in 
delimiting the territorial sea, there is a possibility to implement other methods 
for “historic title” and “other special circumstances” (LOSC, Article 15).
Two comprehensive analyses on maritime delimitation in the Singapore 
Strait involving Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have been carried out 
and published by Beckman and Schofield (2009) and Arsana, Yuniar, and 
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Sumaryo (2010) with attention given to legal and technical aspects. One 
important issue to consider in maritime delimitation is the sovereignty over 
South Ledge, which is currently uncertain. In addition, the impact that the 
three islands/rocks (namely Pedra Branca, Middle Rock, and South Ledge) 
can have to the future maritime delimitation is also worth noting. The extent 
to which the three features affect the location of final boundary lines depends 
on the effect/weight given to each of them. Meanwhile, the effect given to the 
three features depends on their status, whether they are considered islands 
or rocks, pursuant to Article 121 of LOSC or merely LTE which is governed 
by Article 13 of LOSC. 
An island, according to LOSC, is an area of land, which is “naturally 
formed”, “surrounded by waters” and is always “above water at high tide” 
(LOSC, Article 121 (1)). An island that meets the aforementioned criteria is 
entitled to territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ, and continental shelf (LOSC, 
Article 121 (2)). Meanwhile, a rock that cannot sustain human habitation can 
only claim a 12 M territorial sea (LOSC, Article 121 (3)). A geographical object 
that is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by and above water at low 
tide but submerged at high tide is called a LTE. It can only be used as part 
of baselines so that it can claim a 12 M territorial sea if it is located “wholly 
or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from 
the mainland or an island” (LOSC, Article 13 (1)), or it has a lighthouse on it 
(LOSC, Article 7 (4)). This provision indicates how much technical aspects are 
involved in the definition of islands, rocks, and LTE. In order to identify low 
and high tide, for example, tide observation involving hydro-oceanography 
is required. It requires the involvement of geospatial/mapping expertise to 
identify whether a geographical feature can be regarded as an island, rock, or 
LTE. As asserted by Arsana and Sumaryo (2008), geodetic surveyors play an 
important role in ocean affairs and the law of the sea issues. With regard to 
Pedra Branca, Middle Rock, and South Ledge, these technical aspects need to 
be taken into account to define whether the three features are islands, rocks, 
or merely LTEs. Their status is important, as it will affect the extent of the 
maritime area they can claim in the Strait of Singapore, which in turn will 
affect maritime delimitation in the area.
The presence of small islands and other geographical features may be 
considered as the presence of “special circumstances” in relation to territorial 
sea delimitation pursuant to Article 15 of LOSC. Apart from provisions in 
LOSC, the ICJ has also decided cases such as the North Sea Continental Shelf 
case (International Court of Justice 1969), Tunisia/Libya (International Court 
of Justice 1982), Libya/Malta (International Court of Justice 1985) and Qatar 
v. Bahrain (International Court of Justice 2001). The decisions indicate that 
the equitableness of the maritime boundary resulting from the application 
of the equidistance line principle depends on whether the precaution is 
taken of eliminating the “disproportionate effect” caused by small features 
such as islets, rocks, and coastal projections along the coast (Shi 2010). By 
carefully considering the aforementioned issues and criteria, options of 
maritime boundaries in the Singapore Strait involving Indonesia, Malaysia 
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and Singapore are well presented by Beckman and Schofield (2009) and 
Arsana, Yuniar, and Sumaryo (2010). There are several possibilities that the 
States in question may consider by taking into account relevant factors. In 
addition to the ownership and status of the three geographical features, the 
use of different types of baselines is also worth considering. Indonesia, being 
an archipelagic State, can implement archipelagic baselines that theoretically, 
will enable Indonesia to gain more maritime space in the Singapore Strait. 
With regard to the status of the features, it will not be surprising that 
Singapore may regard Pedra Branca as an island that is entitled to not only 
territorial sea but also EEZ and continental shelf. If the feature is considered 
an island, it may generate an EEZ triangle in the maritime area to the northeast 
of Pedra Branca (see Beckman and Schofield 2009). However, Malaysia in this 
case may argue that the small feature does not constitute an island and is only 
entitled to territorial sea. Meanwhile, Indonesia may also argue that the three 
features should be given only nil effect in the delimitation process, considering 
that they are only small features that should not cause disproportionate 
effect in maritime delimitation, as stated by the ICJ in several of its decisions 
(Lowe, Carleton, and Ward 2002; Shi 2010). Figure 8 illustrates options of 
maritime delimitation in the Strait of Singapore (waters off Tanjung Berakit) 
by considering relevant factors such as the ownership and the status of Pedra 
Branca, Middle Rock, and South Ledge. A more detailed explanation on the 
options is provided by Arsana, Yuniar, and Sumaryo (2010).
Figure 8. Maritime delimitation options in the Strait of Singapore (Arsana, Yuniar, 
and Sumaryo 2010: 11).
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4 The way forward
While several maritime boundary disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia 
seem to be unrelated each other, they all have to be viewed as one big issue that 
is closely related to pending maritime boundaries delimitation between the 
two States. In other words, pending maritime boundaries between Indonesia 
and Malaysia is the root of many border problems between the two neighbours. 
It is worth noting that maritime boundaries are not only pending in the 
Sulawesi Sea (Ambalat) or the waters off Tanjung Berakit (Singapore Strait) 
but also in the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea. Even though every 
segment of the maritime boundary is unique, negotiation of one particular 
segment should not be viewed completely independent from that of other 
segments as a solution to one case/segment may indirectly affect the settlement 
of other cases/segments. For example, an agreement/decision in giving full 
or nil effect to a small island that affects one maritime boundary segment may 
be used as a reference in treating another small island in a different location.
As previously highlighted, maritime boundary delimitation can be settled 
through negotiation or submission to a third party. To date, Indonesia and 
Malaysia apparently opt for negotiation in settling their border disputes. Since 
the first Ambalat Block issue sparked in 2005, Indonesia and Malaysia have 
conducted at least seventeen technical-level negotiations, both in Malaysia 
and in Indonesia. The sixteenth negotiation was conducted in Kuantan, 
Malaysia where the two parties attempted to identify potential agreement 
compromising unilateral position/claim of both States (MoFA 2010c). 
According to Indonesia’s MoFA’s press release, the seventeenth would be 
conducted on 23-24 November 2010 the result of which would be available 
for public consumption early December 2010. However, for the purpose of 
this paper, the latest information regarding the seventeenth negotiation could 
not be obtained. Apart from the fact that Indonesia and Malaysia have been 
consistently making progress in maritime delimitation, it is worth noting 
that maritime delimitation is by no means an easy job (MoFA 2010a). The 
negotiation with Malaysia started in the 1960s with the first agreement signed 
in 1969 concerning seabed boundaries in the Malacca Strait and the South 
China Sea. 
Another intriguing question in relation to border dispute settlement 
between Indonesia and Malaysia is whether the two States will bring the 
case before a third party such as ICJ or ITLOS. While an analysis and a 
prediction can be made, there is no guarantee that Indonesia and Malaysia 
will or will not bring the case before a third party. However, it is worth 
noting, as previously highlighted, that bringing the case to ICJ or ITLOS is 
one alternative apart from negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. There are 
several normative considerations when it comes to bringing the case before a 
third party, particularly ICJ. Firstly, bringing the case before ICJ will limit the 
roles of parties in question and their control of the case can be significantly 
minimized. Parties in question no longer have full control in the decision-
making since the decision will be made solely by the court after considering 
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documents prepared by both parties. Secondly, ICJ’s decision is final and 
binding without opportunities to appeal (ICJ Statute, Article 60). This certainly 
has to be agreed upon by parties in question prior to bringing the case before 
ICJ. Thirdly, ICJ’s decision are often ”surprising” to parties in question since 
they are not in full control of the decision-making. The case concerning the Gulf 
of Fonseca involving Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua (intervention) 
is a good example in this regard. ICJ decided that a historical bay could be 
divided among two or more States. In addition, ICJ also allowed Honduras, 
to claim maritime zone in the Pacific Ocean (International Court of Justice 
1992). Thirdly, even though this is debatable, dispute settlement through ICJ 
can be highly costly. The sovereignty case over Pulau Sipadan and Pulau 
Ligitan (International Court of Justice 2002), for instance, cost Indonesia 
around IDR 16 billion as confirmed by the Indonesian former Foreign Minister, 
Hassan Wirajuda (Tempo 2002). As to date, Indonesia and Malaysia have 
been showing consistency in opting to negotiation to pave the way toward 
maritime boundary settlement between them, instead of submitting the case 
to ICJ (Bernama 2009).
One positive impact of the Tanjung Berakit incident is that both States agree 
to accelerate the settlement of maritime boundaries between them (Indonesia 
National Portal 2010). The President of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
(SBY), responded to this incident by delivering a speech on 1 September 
2010.21 Even though some opine that the response was relatively late, SBY 
addressed the issue proportionally by acknowledging relevant technical 
and legal aspects to the case. He rightfully described the case in a legal and 
technical framework as well as in the context of international relations between 
Indonesia and Malaysia. However, as opined by several parties, the speech 
did not seem adequately to represent the feeling of the Indonesian people in 
general. Laymen’s limited knowledge of international law and the maritime 
delimitation principle has been one of the contributing factors to the tensions 
that were building in Indonesia. It seems that SBY opted to put legal and 
technical aspects first, even though, consequently, he sacrificed his popularity 
in his response to the case. In his speech, SBY also specifically mentioned that 
he encouraged that negotiations between Indonesia and Malaysia to settle the 
maritime boundary be accelerated and completed.
Following Spy’s speech, negotiations were carried out by the two States 
where the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of both States served as chief of 
delegation. The negotiations were held on 6 September 2010 in Kota Kinabalu, 
Malaysia (MoFA 2010d). Even though much hope and pressure were put on 
the negotiations, it was not surprising that they could not solve the problem in 
the first instance. It is worth noting that no maritime boundaries can be settled 
in only one short meeting. However, considering the complexity of the issue, 
the meeting may be considered as having been reasonably successful since the 
21 The full text of SBY’s speech (in Indonesian) can be obtained from the President’s official 
website. Available from <http://www.presidensby.info/index.php/pidato/2010/09/01/1473.
html>.
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two States managed to agree to accelerate the process by conducting a series 
of negotiations in October and November 2010 as previously highlighted. As 
noted in a press conference in Jakarta by Indonesia’s foreign minister, Marty 
Natalegawa, maritime boundary negotiation can be a lengthy process. The 
seabed boundary between Indonesia and Vietnam was negotiated for around 
30 years before it was agreed in 2003. However, some other negotiations 
took relatively less time to accomplish. Negotiations between Indonesia and 
Singapore for the western segment of their territorial sea boundary were 
finalized in five years (MoFA 2010a).22
Like other boundary disputes, the solution to the case involving 
Indonesia and Malaysia cannot be easily predicted. Having advantages and 
disadvantages, bilateral negotiation seems to be the most preferable way 
for Indonesia and Malaysia. In a negotiation, all parties are free to express 
their claims and arguments and to take full control of the process toward 
reaching a decision. However, it is worth noting that the main characteristic 
of negotiation is that each party wants something and at that in the end none 
of the parties will gain everything they want. In fact, each party will gain less 
than what they want/propose. This is what negotiation is all about. However, 
this is apparently preferable than the possibility that one party may not gain 
anything, while the other party gains everything it proposes which is what 
may happen if a case is brought before a court or a tribunal. 
Beyond the delimitation process, boundary administration and 
management is important in the future for Indonesia and its neighbours. As 
previously mentioned, maritime boundary lines are imaginary or virtual in 
nature so that the possibility of boundary infringement is relatively higher 
than in the case of land boundaries. Accordingly, a proper understanding of 
coordinates and positioning principles and the utilization of navigation aids 
such as maps and Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) like Global 
Positioning System (GPS) are essential for those who deal with maritime 
boundary issues. This knowledge is not only important for government 
officials, but also for those who spend most of their time in border areas 
such as fishermen and sailors. Intimate and integrated collaboration among 
stakeholders is inevitable to pave the way toward the establishment and 
maintenance of the virtual fences between States. 
5 Concluding remarks
Pending maritime boundary delimitation between Indonesia and Malaysia 
in several locations is one of the reasons of tension building between the two 
neighbouring countries. Indonesia and Malaysia have yet to finalize maritime 
boundary delimitation in four locations: namely, the Malacca Strait, the South 
China Sea, the Sulawesi Sea, and the Singapore Strait. Pending maritime 
boundaries in the Singapore Strait seems to have been the main reason for 
the Tanjung Berakit incident on 13 August 2010. 
22  For Minister Marty Natalegawa’s more detailed explanation, listen to the recorded 
audio from <http://www.deplu.go.id/Pages/Audio.aspx?IDP=39&l=id>.
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The Tanjung Berakit incident involved the apprehension of Malaysian 
fisheries and Indonesian officials around the waters off Tanjung Berakit, 
the sovereignty over which is currently uncertain. However, Indonesia and 
Malaysia have their own unilateral maritime claims in the area which and there 
are therefore areas on which both States extend their claim. Consequently, 
there is no consensus about the boundary line in the area and each State 
has its own version of the boundary line based on its own unilateral claim. 
Law enforcement through sea patrol and similar activities conducted by 
both States were based only on unilateral claims, not on an agreements or 
regulations agreed upon by both States. Indonesian officials view the presence 
of Malaysians in an area of overlapping claim as an infringement and so do 
Malaysian officials in case of Indonesian presence in the same area. A geospatial 
analysis of the maps of Indonesia and Malaysia’s unilateral maritime claims 
shows that there are several options and scenarios of infringement committed 
by one party against the other.
The key to resolving the Tanjung Berakit incident is maritime boundary 
delimitation between Indonesia and Malaysia in the Strait of Singapore. This 
is being undertaken by both parties through a series of bilateral negotiations. 
Ideally speaking, maritime boundary delimitation is based on the principles 
governed by the LOSC and relevant jurisprudences with proportional attention 
given to relevant, such as geographic factors (length of relevant coastlines/
baselines, the presence of small islands/rocks and LTE). In addition, current 
and existing activities Indonesia and Malaysia have conducted for generations 
in the area should also be taken into consideration.
A series of negotiations between Indonesia concerning maritime 
delimitation have been progressing. Indonesian experts and officials led by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and supported by technical agencies such 
as National Coordinating Agency for Surveys and Mapping (Bakosurtanal) 
and Dishidros, are involved in facilitating these negotiations. There is no 
denying that the public may not be well informed of the progress they have 
been making since there is substantial confidentiality. It is worth noting that 
the public may not always be able to obtain the most updated and actual 
information about maritime boundary delimitation between Indonesia and 
its neighbours. Disproportionate reactions from the public and inaccurate 
information provided by media (newspapers, electronic media, etcetera) 
regarding border disputes indicate that the communication process between 
the government and the public needs to be improved. It is a challenge for 
the government to find a balance between providing as much information 
as possible to the public while securing confidential information in order to 
maintain good relations during the ongoing negotiation process.
Indonesia is the largest archipelagic State in the world and two third of its 
area is ocean. Indonesia views its area as an integrated unity of land territory 
and maritime jurisdiction. Due to its geographical position, Indonesia has 
ten neighbours to deal with, so that maritime delimitation should always be 
on the top of its priority list. In addition to efforts by government officials, 
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academics (researchers, lecturers, students, scholars) should be able to play 
strategic roles through critical studies and quality publications. In order to 
balance information news media provide, which are sometimes provocative 
and biased, academics should publish articles that based on scientific and 
legal analysis. The availability of improved information derived from many 
different sources will enable the public to understand more comprehensively 
and respond more accurately to border dispute cases. All relevant stakeholders 
need to collaborate in building and maintaining the virtual wall between 
Indonesia and its neighbours. 
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